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The Cognitive Foundations of Tacit Commitments:  





People often make, and are held to account for, purely tacit commitments in interactions with 
other people: commitments that have never been explicitly articulated or agreed. Moreover, 
unspoken, tacit commitments are often perceived as binding: people often stick to, and are 
expected to stick to, these commitments, even where it might seem against their interests to do 
so. If they do not stick to these commitments, they may be punished, and expect to be punished, 
by others as a result, even if the act of punishment is itself costly for the punisher. These 
commitments have been widely seen as a crucial underpinning for human collaboration and 
cooperation. Yet how do such commitments arise, and are they compatible with human 
rationality? This paper provides a formal, reasoning-based account of tacit commitments based 
on “virtual bargaining”—a mode of reasoning that joins elements of individualistic and 
collaborative reasoning. We complement existing accounts by showing that even purely self-
interested individuals can, under certain conditions, tacitly commit to punishing counterparts 
who violate an unenforceable agreement, or to cooperating in dynamic games, including the 







The human ability to make, and stick to, commitments is crucial to human social interactions and 
relationships, as well as underpinning many economic transactions (Clark, 2006; Michael, 
Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2016; Nesse, 2001; Tomasello, 2020). Human social interactions are a 
continual back-and-forth—and the commitments involved in such interactions typically have the 
same character. One person performs an action, anticipating that the other will respond in a 
particular way, who in turn may expect a further response from the first—and the entire sequence 
may be guided by tacit (or sometimes explicitly stated) commitments.  
Consider, for example, the tacit commitments that underpin even the smallest and least 
consequential interactions, such as one person lending another a pen. When the pen is handed 
over, there is typically a tacit agreement about timeframe and purpose. If, at the bank kiosk, one 
person asks to borrow a pen from another, there is a tacit agreement that the pen is being 
borrowed just to sign a particular cheque or form, rather than for a day or a year; and both parties 
tacitly agree that, unless explicitly agreed otherwise, the borrower should not break the pen in 
two or otherwise damage it; that, if the pen is inadvertently lost, the borrower should apologize 
and perhaps offer an equivalent pen; that the borrower cannot normally loan the pen to a third 
person, and so on. Similarly, the lender cannot subsequently demand payment, unless explicitly 
agreed beforehand.  
But unless people feel under some obligation to stick to the commitment (and to enforce the 
commitment if the other deviates), such interactions are likely to fail. Having borrowed the pen, 
the borrower may think it convenient not to give it back; and purely ‘forward looking’ rational 
agents will know that it is surely pointless to get involved in a serious confrontation with another 
person, potentially even escalating into physical violence, over so small a matter as a pen. This 
seems to imply that rational agents won’t return pens if they would rather not; and, consequently, 
that no rational agent will lend a pen in the first place. Indeed, more broadly, routine social 
interactions of all kinds will break down unless people can be “trusted” to be guided by the 
obligation to follow commitment (Dunning & Fetchenhauer, 2011; Tomasello, 2020). 
Indeed, the ability to make, enforce, and stick to commitments seems crucial in order to 
maintain coherence in social interactions of many kinds, from conversational exchanges, jointly 
cooking a meal, planning an event, bringing in each other’s harvest, making a piece of flat-pack 





Recent decades have seen great interest in philosophy and in developmental and social 
psychology in the idea of joint action (Garrod & Pickering, 2009; Pesquita, Whitwell, & Enns, 
2018; Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). Most joint actions are, of course, not 
instantaneous, but involve sequences of sub-actions contributed by the parties concerned. To 
sustain such a joint action, both parties need to be jointly committed, and to know that they are 
jointly committed, to playing their respective parts in the joint action. Indeed, successful social 
interactions seem to require a joint understanding between the parties that they are implicitly 
‘signed up to.’ Thus, the person lending the pen expects the other to be committed to returning it 
promptly; the person receiving the pen is committed to doing so, and knows that the other knows 
this, and so on. And if the receiver of the pen were to transgress (e.g., by pocketing the pen, 
breaking it, putting it in their mouth, etc.), they would anticipate that the other would view such 
behavior as violating the commitment. The transgressor would expect reprimand (if their 
transgression were noticed); and the other would feel licensed and perhaps even socially required 
to provide it.  
 While fundamental to social life, the ability to form such tacit commitments over sequential 
interactions is, in many cases, puzzling from the point of view of a rational choice explanation of 
behavior, as embodied in standard game-theoretic notions that rely on the logic of backward 
induction. The apparent difficulty is that rational agents will choose their actions based on their 
likely future consequences, with no direct regard to what they have committed themselves to in 
the past, unless there is an explicit mechanism that mandates implementing a prior commitment. 
Thus, a rational agent will follow a commitment just when it is in her future best interests to do 
so, but not otherwise; and a commitment that one only follows when it is in one’s interests to do 
so is, in many circumstances, scarcely a meaningful commitment at all (e.g., Jensen, 2009). 
Indeed, what makes commitments powerful in helping coordinate social and economic life is 
that, to some degree at least, we can rely on people to stick to their commitments even in 
circumstances in which they would rather not.1  
 
1 While ubiquitous in social interactions of all kinds, this phenomenon is most intensively studied in 
economics, under the heading of “hold-up” problems, and is a central to the theory of incomplete 
contracts and the theory of the firm (Hart, 1995). One approach to the problem in economic contexts can 
be explicit contracts (e.g., Rogerson, 1992) which are enforceable by the law, backed by the judicial 
system. Such mechanisms are rarely available in everyday social interactions, of course; and even if they 
were, the challenge of writing suitably “complete” contracts, and the potential costs of enforcement, 





This problem is amplified in dynamic games by what we call the “curse of backward 
induction,” which causes commitments involved in mutually beneficial interactions to unravel, 
according to conventional rational accounts. As we have noted, if it is the case that once the pen 
has been lent, the borrower is not really committed to returning it (and has a self-interest in not 
doing so), then it seems to follow that the pen will not be lent in the first place. Similarly, if two 
farmers help each other bring in each other’s harvests on alternating days, a purely self-interested 
farmer would stop once their own harvest finished and not help the other on the final day. 
Knowing this, the other farmer would plan to stop on the day before (because they would 
anticipate getting no help on the last day); and hence the first farmer would have no reason to 
help on the day before that, and so on. Backward induction will imply that cooperation will never 
begin, however mutually beneficial it might be for each farmer. We shall see later that the curse 
of backward induction looms large in classic experimental games, such as the Centipede game 
and the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. These games seem to show that rational agents 
will be unable to engage in mutually advantageous interactions. Yet experimental studies 
(Krockow, Colman, & Pulford, 2016; Krockow, Pulford, & Colman, 2018; McKelvey & Palfrey, 
1992) have shown that people do engage in mutually beneficial collaboration to a considerable 
degree in such contexts. Are these successes due to a failure of human rationality? We will 
argue, instead, that a different theory of rational social interaction, based on virtual bargaining 
(Chater, Zeitoun, & Melkonyan, in press; Melkonyan, Zeitoun, & Chater, 2018; Misyak, 
Melkonyan, Zeitoun, & Chater, 2014), provides a reason-based explanation of why even purely 
self-interested agents need not be subject to the curse of backward induction, and can engage in 
sequences of mutually beneficial interactions.  
A particularly important case where backward induction creates puzzles for standard rational 
accounts concerns threats of punishment. Suppose farmer A does indeed fail to turn up on the 
final day of harvest to help at B’s farm. B will surely be angry, and perhaps initiate conflict of 
some kind. But conflict will typically not merely be aversive for A, but also unpleasant for B. 
Indeed, were this not the case, a purely self-interested B might engage in conflict, whether A 
helped or not. But if conflict is unpleasant for B, then A will predict that, once harvest is over, B 
will not punish A (because this just makes B’s bad situation even worse). Thus, a tacit, or even 
explicit, threat by B appears to be an empty threat, if B is a purely self-interested rational agent. 





induction then leads to the conclusion that A will not turn up on the final day, or B on the day 
before, and so on, so that mutually beneficially alternation of help between A and B is blocked.2 
 There is, moreover, a further puzzling aspect of commitments in most human interactions: 
the fact that although commitments are sometimes made explicitly—in forms ranging from 
informal plans and promises, to legally binding contracts—the vast majority of commitments, 
such as those governing lending a pen, are largely implicit: the agreement is somehow 
“understood” by both parties, yet never formulated in words. So, for example, a passing 
customer may hand over some coins to a news vendor and pick up the morning paper without a 
word being exchanged; a passenger may state an address when getting into a cab, but with no 
discussion of a tacit commitment to pay the driver on arrival, or that the driver should take the 
quickest route and not, for example, stop for a lunch break in the middle of the journey. 
Similarly, people buy rounds of drinks without seeking, or receiving, any explicit commitment 
from another person to buy the next round; families share food (e.g., a freshly made cake or a 
box of chocolates) under tacit commitments that one person is not allowed to eat the lot when the 
others backs are turned (although such commitments are sometimes broken, of course). A social 
world without reliable commitments would be a hostile one indeed—people would seem 
continually pitched as potential adversaries, each following their best interests. The degree to 
which we can expect others reliably to adhere to their typically tacit commitments is closely 
related to the level of trust between people, which has been viewed as a central determinant of 
individual and societal well-being (e.g., Fukuyama, 1996; O’Neill, 2002). But, from a rational 
choice perspective, it is puzzling that trust in commitments—especially tacit commitments—is 
so ubiquitous.  
Why, then, do rational agents make and stick to commitments, and especially, tacit 
commitments? What are the cognitive mechanisms from which they arise? Existing research in 
the rational choice tradition offers different answers to these questions. It may be assumed that 
 
2 Reputational factors may, of course, give people an incentive to maintain their agreements—if farmer A 
develops a reputation for violating agreements, then it may reasonably be expected to lead to other people 
not entering into mutually beneficial agreements with A in the future. But in cases where people’s 
interactions are not directly observed by others, this mechanism does not apply for purely self-interested 
rational agents interested in maximizing their payoffs, because A and B cannot be relied upon to reliably 
report A’s behavior (as their reports, as well as all their behavior, will be chosen to optimize their 
interests, rather than to follow a tacit agreement to tell the truth). This is an aspect of the problem of so-






individuals have non-standard preferences: e.g., they may be of a certain “cooperative type” 
(e.g., Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, & Wilson, 1982) or have altruistic preferences in rewarding 
cooperative, and punishing uncooperative, behavior by their counterparts (e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 
2002). Another strand of rational explanation focuses on how people can utilize external 
commitment devices (e.g., burning bridges behind them) to modify the costs of implementing 
commitments (e.g., Benabou & Tirole, 2004), so that it becomes in their best interests to follow 
the commitment once it is made. While these commitment devices undoubtedly arise in many 
contexts, this type of analysis does not resolve the fundamental puzzle that people often do 
follow commitments, crucially including entirely tacit commitments, when it would appear to be 
in their best interests not to do so. 
One reaction to these difficulties is to suggest that behavior in making and honoring 
commitments must arise from something other than a rational attempt to obtain good 
consequences from an interaction. For example, people might follow their commitments because 
they feel this is “morally right” (Malle, 2021) or socially “appropriate” (March & Olsen, 2008), 
or even from habits accrued through a history of reinforcement (e.g., Skinner, 1971). But we 
suggest that, in some circumstances at least, mutually beneficial interactions between people can 
be justified in terms of reasons.3 Indeed, people who engage in such collaborations can still gain 
enormously (even if a farmer is occasionally cheated on the very last day of harvest). Perhaps, 
then, we need a shift in our conception of what counts as a rational approach to social 
interaction—one that avoids the curse of backward induction, and that provides a rational 
justification for mutually beneficial interactions that involve making, and in large part sticking 
to, commitments.  
In this paper, we outline an explanation for the human ability to create, and follow, tacit 
commitments in social and economic interactions—one that arises from the individual’s 
reasoning process itself. We argue that people are tacitly committed to some course of action 
when it is clear that this commitment would have been agreed, had a process of actual discussion 
or negotiation occurred. This requires that each party knows the nature of the agreement—i.e., 
 
3 In rational choice theory, it is typically assumed that choosing in one’s best interest (allowing that one’s 
own interest may incorporate concern for the well-being of others) is a basic tenet of rationality. Reason-
based explanation in philosophy and psychology is much broader than this specific notion of rationality, 
however—reasons may include procedural justice, prior promises, expectations, norms of politeness, or 





who is part of the agreement; what each of them and the others are tacitly committed to; and, 
moreover, that the agreement is common knowledge between them (in the usage in game-theory 
and epistemic logic: knowing the agreement, knowing that the others know it, knowing that the 
others know that they know it, and so on).  
Yet if a tacit agreement is never formulated and discussed explicitly, how can this common 
knowledge of what is agreed arise? Our starting point is that tacit commitments arise from a 
process of “virtual bargaining”—a mentally simulated process of negotiation about what we 
would agree, were we to bargain explicitly (Chater, Misyak, Melkonyan, & Zeitoun, 2016; 
Chater et al., in press; Melkonyan et al., 2018; Misyak et al., 2014). Often, we will see, there is a 
“natural” bargain that would be agreed upon—and this natural agreement can be inferred by all 
players. Through simulating the bargaining process, all parties can infer, and can infer that others 
infer, the tacit commitment to which they are collectively “signed up” for. 
A crucial question, of course, is what determines the virtual bargain. A simple, but 
unsatisfactory, approach, would be for both parties to imagine that they could agree on a binding 
contract, as if it were legally enforceable. This approach would make cooperation easy to 
explain—for example, the farmers in our example above would simply mentally simulate which 
written and enforceable contract they would sign up to—and this would presumably be that each 
would agree to help the other throughout the entire harvest. Having made this mental simulation, 
they would then behave accordingly. But this approach is inadequate. It would, for example, be 
equally possible to make agreements in which A helps B for the first half of the harvest, and then 
B helps A for the second half. But such an agreement puts A in real jeopardy, because, in reality, 
there is no legally binding and enforceable agreement, and B might not return A’s help. Indeed, if 
people were guided by imagined enforceable agreements, they would continually be in danger of 
being badly exploited by selfish counterparts.  
The theory of virtual bargaining therefore takes a different approach. It assumes that, when 
considering a possible virtual bargain, each person considers not only the possibility that the 
bargain is adhered to, but that their counterpart may unilaterally depart from the bargain, to 
maximize their own selfish interests. Thus, the farmers would consider their own payoff in the 
scenario in which each helps the other as promised; but also consider the possibility that the 
other might exploit them to maximize their own gain. Now, the virtues of helping each other on 





withdraw her labor only on the last day. While this outcome disadvantages the other farmer, the 
overall benefit of their collaboration through the preceding days may still make the collaboration 
worthwhile for both. So, this is an agreement that both parties might sign up to—because even if 
one attempts to be exploitative, the results for both are still pretty good: the bargain is fairly 
“exploitation-proof.” But if A helps B for the first half of the harvest, and B turns out to be 
exploitative, then this will be a very bad outcome for A. For this reason, A would never “sign up” 
to such an agreement, because it allows for considerable exploitation. The theory of virtual 
bargaining assumes that people choose which bargain to agree by taking account of both the 
possibility that the bargain will be followed, but also the possibility that the other may 
unilaterally depart from the bargain to maximize her own interests. Indeed, the virtual bargaining 
account assumes that agents are what we will call “cautious” regarding such outcomes—each 
evaluates the bargain based on whichever case has the worst outcome for themselves.4  
The theory of virtual bargaining has hitherto been developed primarily for static interactions, 
in which the parties simultaneously and independently choose a single action. But human 
interactions, and the tacit commitments that guide them, typically involve sequences of actions 
unfolding over time—e.g., a pen is requested, lent, not returned, the borrower complains, and so 
on. One key contribution of this paper is to extend the theory of virtual bargaining to capture the 
simulated process of forming tacit commitments in this type of “dynamic” setting involving an 
unfolding, and potentially interacting, sequence of actions from each player.  
We shall see that, crucially, the dynamic virtual bargaining analysis may turn seemingly 
empty threats into credible ones. Relatedly, it may explain cooperative behavior in finitely 
repeated interactions, but avoid the curse of backward induction, as we saw above with the 
example of the two farmers. We will see that mutually beneficial cooperation in such finitely 
 
4 We note that, when contemplating adopting a virtual bargain, it makes sense to wonder whether the 
other will follow the bargain or unilaterally depart from it to maximize her own interests. But a farmer 
does not need to worry about where she herself will follow the bargain—she can, of course, trust herself 
to follow whatever hypothetical course of action she thinks best. By contrast, standard game-theoretic 
reasoning implies that a person cannot trust themselves to follow through with any course of action. 
Indeed, quite the opposite—it requires that they follow whatever course of action maximizes their own 
interests, irrespective of any prior commitments, tacit or otherwise. We note, too, that our assumption of 
“caution” may seem excessively pessimistic, through concentrating on the worst of the two possible 
scenarios. A more general account that assigns probabilities to each possibility can be imagined, but is left 





repeated interactions can be sustained through both parties forming a tacit agreement and 
embracing collaborative reasoning while still caring about their own goals.  
We extend existing rational choice theory by proposing that tacit commitments can emerge 
even with purely self-interested preferences, based on the individuals’ mode of reasoning. In this 
paper, to explore the implications of virtual bargaining as a mode of reasoning in dynamic 
interactions, we will make the simplest possible assumptions otherwise: that our agents are 
entirely self-interested, have no concerns about reputation, and so on. It is, though, quite possible 
to introduce these other factors, which aim to increase the behavioral realism of rational choice 
accounts, alongside the virtual bargaining approach. Our approach is intended to be 
complementary to, rather than in competition with, accounts that focus on these other factors. 
We propose that tacit commitments often arise from a process of mentally simulated, or 
“virtual,” bargaining,5 which do not emerge from an explicit process of offer and counteroffer, 
and indeed are not formulated explicitly at all. Explicit processes of bargaining and codification 
of agreements can be costly in both time and money; but often they appear to be unnecessary. 
Transacting parties can come to a tacit agreement governing their interaction without 
communication. They can, moreover, construct tacit agreements in a highly flexible way to deal 
with specific unexpected situations that they may face—and that might not have been anticipated 
in an explicit contract. Although many disciplines in the social sciences emphasize the 
importance of general tacit conventions, customs, and norms of all kinds (e.g., Cialdini, 2007), 
there has been less attention to the question of how these are applied to create agreements in 
specific contexts.6 
 
5 Here, tacit agreements are closed connected with the notion of “pacts” in psycholinguistics (Brennan & 
Clark, 1996). The notion is also related to, but not identical with, notions of the psychological contract, 
especially between employees and employers (Argyris, 1960; Rousseau, 1995; Rousseau & Shperling, 
2003)—see Chater, Zeitoun & Melkonyan (in press) for discussion. Note that tacit agreements differ also 
from “implicit contracts” discussed in economics (e.g., Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 2002): tacit 
agreements can arise spontaneously even in one-shot interactions, whereas implicit contracts typically 
rely on repeated interactions. The two notions are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, our theory is related 
to existing literature on “internal commitments” or self-regulation mechanisms such as prudent saving 
behavior, regular exercising and keeping a healthy diet (e.g., Benabou & Tirole, 2004). Benabou & Tirole 
(2004) build a theory of internal commitments, which builds on Ainslie (1992, 2001), based on imperfect 
recall of past feelings and motives. However, rather than examining commitments relating to an 
individual’s self-regulation in non-strategic situations, we focus on tacit (internal) commitments in 
interactions between individuals. 
6 This distinction between general and specific (tacit) agreements is analogous to the question in the legal 





The human tendency to create and follow tacit agreements has deep psychological 
foundations. Where people explicitly pre-commit to an action, or are tacitly taken to be 
committed to it, they appear to have a psychological pull to go through with their commitment 
(and they object when others do not)—a tendency that humans develop from a very young age. 
To illustrate, Rakoczy, Warneken, and Tomasello (2008) showed two- and three-year-old 
children examples of adults engaging in a novel action labeled “daxing.” The children strongly 
objected when a hand-puppet announced that it would dax, but then produced a different action. 
Crucially, young children would also protest against the violation of tacit rules without prior 
agreement—e.g., if they observed an agent using an object in a location where they had inferred 
by observation that this location was not permitted (Rakoczy, Brosche, Warneken, & Tomasello, 
2009). Highlighting the importance of tacit agreements even further, some scholars have argued 
that many of our “moral” emotions focus primarily on commitments to (or violations of) explicit 
or tacit rules of behavior, rather than solely the outcomes of people’s actions (Nichols, 2004). 
Moreover, the sense of obligation generated by tacit commitments appears fundamental to the 
rich collaborative behavior observed in human societies (Tomasello, 2020). 
To analyze the reasoning process about tacit agreements, we develop a general formal theory 
of tacit commitment through virtual bargaining (Chater et al., 2016; Chater et al., in press; 
Melkonyan et al., 2018; Misyak et al., 2014) by developing new equilibrium notions for virtual 
bargaining in dynamic games. We formally analyze these solution concepts in four games 
representing broad classes of interactions: the Gas Station game (which is an abstract 
representation of the ubiquitous real-world situations where two individuals sequentially 
exchange goods for money without being observed by a third party), the Repeated Bertrand 
Competition game, the Centipede game, and the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. These 
games approximate many real-life interactions, but they are stylized representations, where talk 
of prisoners and gas stations is really a “cover story” to explain the structure of the game.7 In 
each game, we compare the virtual bargaining solution concepts with each other and with the 
 
example, consumer protection laws allow for a range of ways in which a bank can lend money. Within 
these constraints, the bank and its customer will agree on the type of contract (e.g., a mortgage or a 
payday loan) and the terms and conditions depending on the nature of their specific transaction. Specific 
tacit agreements are our main focus here. 
7 Thus, these games are not intended to capture the fine details of actual plea-bargaining challenges faced 





subgame perfect equilibria. We find that, under certain conditions, virtual bargaining enables 
even self-interested individuals to tacitly commit, and stick, to a course of action that deviates 
from, and may lead to better outcomes than, standard predictions. 
To give a taste of our equilibrium notions in dynamic interactions, consider an abstract 
version of the farming example we gave above: a variant of the well-known Centipede game 
(Aumann, 1988; Rosenthal, 1981), which provides a classic puzzle for rational choice analysis. 
In this game, the players move sequentially and, whenever it is a player’s turn to move, she can 
either end the game or continue, with the latter action resulting in a slight loss to themselves and 
a considerable gain to the other—with them being limited to some known, finite, number of 
turns. If the players can somehow contrive to continue the game to the end, then each will 
receive many large gains and suffer much smaller losses—so continuing the game is mutually 
highly beneficial. But these benefits appear difficult to reconcile with standard models of 
rationality. The standard game-theoretic analysis assumes that rational players will play a so-
called “subgame perfect equilibrium” which, by the logic of backward induction, predicts that 
the game ends on the very first move, so that the potential mutual benefits of playing the game 
are lost to both players. This is unsatisfactory not just normatively, in that rational agents appear 
to forgo a considerable opportunity for mutual benefit; but also in light of a significant body of 
experimental evidence (see, e.g., Krockow et al., 2016; Krockow et al., 2018; McKelvey & 
Palfrey, 1992), showing that experimental subjects often choose to continue the game for a 
relatively long fraction of the strategic interaction and that a non-negligible number of players 
continue to almost the very end.  
We argue that the players contemplate a tacit agreement to continue the game to the very end 
of the strategic interaction. Each player realizes that her opponent may deviate from this tacit 
agreement. At the same time, each player realizes that, even if such deviation were to occur, it 
would take place in the very end, and this course of action would be preferable to alternative tacit 
agreements. In other words, each player asks the question, “What is the worst thing that can 
happen to me if I follow the tacit agreement, and, suspecting this, my opponent deviates from the 
agreement to maximize her own payoff on the assumption that I stick to it (i.e., what game-
theorists call “best responding”)?”8 and finds the answer, “The opponent will continue to 
 
8 A “best-response” to an opponent’s strategy is a strategy that has the highest expected payoff, given the 





“almost” the very end by deviating only during her last play,” to be rather re-assuring. For both 
players to embrace this type of reasoning, it must be the case that they both think as virtual 
bargainers seeking tacit agreements. Thus, in addition to individualistic reasoning, the two 
players must have their “collaborative hats” on. It seems that the very nature of the Centipede 
game (as well as many other dynamic games, where there are significant advantages from 
coordinated actions) will lead many players to embrace such reasoning. As we shall discuss later, 
however, some individuals may not embrace this type of reasoning, and therefore may require 
non-standard preferences to achieve cooperative outcomes, or they may not achieve cooperative 
outcomes at all. 
 
2. DEFINITIONS OF VIRTUAL BARGAINING 
 
We outline the intuition behind the virtual bargaining approach, leaving the formal definitions to 
the Appendix. We begin by summarizing our existing analysis examining games in which 
strategies are chosen simultaneously and independently (Chater et al., 2016; Melkonyan et al., 
2018; Misyak et al., 2014)—this is known as games in ‘normal form’ in game theory. 
 The core intuition is that players consider possible bargains9 that they might reach: this 
corresponds to a set of strategies. When considering whether a bargain is acceptable, each player, 
i, considers two possibilities: (i) that all players follow the bargain; and (ii) that while i herself 
follows the bargain, all of the others choose strategies that are individual best-responses to the 
bargain. The idea is that when agreeing to a bargain, we are concerned with what happens if the 
bargain is implemented, and with what happens if we are “betrayed” or “exploited”. In 
evaluating the attractiveness of a bargain, we do not have to consider whether we ourselves will 
follow the terms of the bargain; our concern is only that others may not do so. We assume that 
each player’s payoff does not directly depend on the payoffs of other players but it may depend 
on the latter indirectly through strategic reasoning and its effect on choices.  We also suppose 
 
is defined as a set of strategies such that each strategy is a best response to the others. A strategy in a 
dynamic extensive form game specifies a player’s choice in every contingency where it is that player’s 
turn to move. Thus, when determining her best response, a player considers choices in each possible 
contingency – all possible paths are taken into account, given a fixed strategy of the opponent. 





that players are cautious, in that they evaluate each bargain according to what we shall call the 
worst payoff (i.e., the minimum of their outcomes in cases (i) and (ii)). Note that each bargain 
has its distinct worst payoff for each player in the game. A player’s worst payoff for a bargain 
depends on the bargain’s prescription for the player under consideration and the opponents’ 
behavior (the prescription of the bargain for the opponents and the opponents’ individual best 
responses).  
We stipulate that a strategy profile is a feasible agreement if no player can improve her worst 
payoff by unilaterally modifying her own strategy and playing any other strategy (a formal 
discussion is introduced below). This is analogous to the familiar notion of Nash equilibrium, but 
applied to the modified game where payoff for each strategy profile is replaced by the worst 
payoff for that strategy profile. Feasible agreements seem a natural constraint on what people 
might tacitly agree: if each player attempts to maximize their worst payoff, then they will not 
choose an agreement where, by a unilateral change, they can find a better agreement in terms of 
its worst payoff. Note that all Nash equilibria are feasible agreements; but, crucially, there can be 
feasible agreements that are not Nash equilibria. 
Many games have multiple feasible agreements. To select a specific feasible agreement, a 
process of mentally simulated bargaining is proposed. The chosen feasible agreement(s) is the 
one that the players would agree upon if they were able to bargain explicitly (if the outcome of 
this mentally simulated bargaining is unclear to the players, they will not reliably be able to form 
a tacit agreement). The process by which players “simulate” the bargaining process could, in 
principle, be modelled by any theory of explicit bargaining (e.g., Kalai, 1977). For concreteness 
and simplicity, we assume that the choice is made by simulating the results of a particularly 
simple and well-known model of bargaining known as Nash bargaining (Nash, 1950), which 
maximizes the product of utility gains from the putative bargain over and above what will be 
gained if there is disagreement: i.e., no bargain is reached (see expression (5) in Appendix). The 
Nash bargaining solution represents an outcome of a bargaining process where each player gets 
her disagreement payoff plus a share of the benefits from reaching an agreement. We call the 
chosen agreement the Virtual Bargaining Equilibrium (VBE). 
To illustrate, consider a game that has three feasible agreements (𝑥1, 𝑥2), (𝑦1, 𝑦2) and (𝑧1, 𝑧2), 
where the variables with index 𝑖 = 1,2 denote the strategies of player 𝑖. Suppose that both 





worst payoff under (𝑦1, 𝑦2) is 7 while player 2’s is 9. Under agreement (𝑧1, 𝑧2), both players’ 
worst payoff is equal to 8. Under this parameterization, the two players’ disagreement positions 
are characterized by the worst payoff of 2, which is the minimum worst payoff in a feasible 
agreement. The product of utility gains from bargain (𝑥1, 𝑥2) over the players’ disagreement 
payoffs is equal to (2 − 2) ∙ (2 − 2) = 0. Similarly, the product of utility gains from bargain 
(𝑦1, 𝑦2) over the players’ disagreement payoffs is equal to (7 − 2) ∙ (9 − 2) = 35. And finally, 
the product of utility gains from bargain (𝑧1, 𝑧2) over the players’ disagreement payoffs is equal 
to (8 − 2) ∙ (8 − 2) = 36. The agreement (𝑧1, 𝑧2) is the VBE since it achieves the largest 
product of utility gains.  
 For many generic games, the set of feasible agreements is different from the set of Nash 
equilibria and the selection from the set of feasible agreements (via Nash bargaining) includes 
agreements that are better for all parties, than any Nash equilibrium (i.e., using Economics 
jargon, the set of feasible agreements Pareto “dominates” all Nash equilibria). This fact, together 
with the formal definition provided in Appendix, illustrates that virtual bargaining equilibrium is 
different from existing equilibrium notions that refine the set of Nash equilibria by invoking 
Pareto efficiency, coalition-proofness, or some other criterion (see, e.g., Bernheim, Peleg, & 
Whinston, 1987). 
We now turn to examining virtual agreements in dynamic games, where players interact over 
a sequence of moves. In game theory, such dynamic interactions are often represented as what 
are called extensive-form games: an explicit representation of the sequencing of players’ choices, 
and of the information of each player at her every decision point about the other players’ prior 
moves (for technical background see, for example, Binmore, 2007). As before, suppose that the 
game has 𝑛 players.10 We will say that a strategy profile is a virtual bargaining equilibrium of an 
extensive-form game Γ if that strategy profile is a VBE of the normal-form game corresponding 
to Γ.11 Thus, if a strategy profile is a VBE of an extensive-form game, the players can virtually 
agree to a course of action under each possible contingency (i.e., in technical game-theoretic 
 
10 We assume that there are no external factors that also affect the outcome of the game—in the language 
of game theory, we assume that the game has no moves by Nature. 
11 Thus, we define the VBE of an extensive-form game similarly to how a Nash equilibrium of an 





terms, this means for each information set12) and even for contingencies that may be ruled out by 
the player’s earlier choices. In other words, even if a player deviates from the VBE at some point 
in the game, her opponents may stick to their part of the virtual agreement. Thus, the players 
have an ability to virtually pre-commit to follow a course of action (at each of her information 
sets) virtually agreed upon in the very beginning of the strategic interaction. In what follows, we 
will refer to “VBE of an extensive-form game” as simply “VBE.” 
Consider now the scenario where the players cannot virtually pre-commit to an agreement 
governing the entire course of their strategic interaction. Rather, at each point in the game that 
starts a subgame13, they can virtually renegotiate the strategy profile that they have previously 
agreed upon. Formally, we will say that strategy profile 𝜎𝑉  is a subgame virtual bargaining 
equilibrium (SVBE)14 if for every subgame the strategy 𝜎𝑉 restricted to the subgame constitutes 
a virtual bargaining equilibrium for the subgame. That is, when one considers any subgame as a 
game in its own, the prescription of the overall agreement for that subgame constitutes a VBE. 
Roughly speaking, starting from any point in the game, the players do not have a strict incentive 
to renegotiate their initial virtual bargain. 
Suppose that players do not possess private information, move sequentially, and learn all of 
the moves made in the game immediately after these moves are made. Consider the very last 
choice nodes (where a choice leads to the end of the game) of this type of game. A player whose 
turn it is to move at such a node will choose the action that maximizes her payoff (she will be 
virtually bargaining with herself and will choose the best course of action). Turning to the 
penultimate nodes (those that precede the last choice nodes), a player whose turn it is to move at 
such a node will foresee the subsequent choices that will be made and will virtually renegotiate 
 
12 A player’s information set is a collection of that player’s decision nodes such that she cannot 
distinguish between any of these nodes. To illustrate, consider a game between two players that has 8 
stages. Suppose that the two players move sequentially with player 1 choosing in the odd-numbered 
stages while player 2 choosing in the even-numbered stages. The set of player 1’s information sets is the 
union of all of her information sets in each odd-numbered stage. For example, the set of player 1’s 
information sets in period 3 is given by the set of all choice nodes in period 3 and each such information 
set corresponds to a distinct scenario how player 1 played in period 1 and player 2 played in period 2. 
Finally, the set of player 2’s information sets can be defined similarly. For more details see, e.g., Binmore 
(2007).  
13 A subgame is any part of the game that starts with a singleton information set such that (i) all 
successors of a node in the subgame belong to the former and (ii) if a node belongs to the subgame then 
all nodes in the same information set with that node belong to the subgame.  





(with herself) an action that maximizes her payoff, given the subsequent optimal choices. 
Continuing this backward induction procedure, we conclude that at each point in the game the 
player whose turn it is to move will virtually negotiate with herself and choose the action that 
maximizes own payoff, given the subsequent optimal choices. Hence, SVBE collapses into 
subgame perfection. 
 The psychological implications of this observation are intriguing. Virtual bargaining in 
extensive-form games enables people or organizations to coordinate to follow mutually 
beneficial agreements (e.g., as we shall discuss further below, engaging in trade in the Gas 
Station game; cooperating in the Centipede or Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games), 
where such agreements are determined prior to the game. The possibility of commitment to such 
agreements (i.e., that each player has to allow for the possibility that the other may go through 
with the agreement, even if this is not the other’s best response) enables threats to engage in 
mutually damaging conflict to be credible deterrents; and blocks the backward induction 
arguments that would otherwise preclude sequences of cooperative interactions.15 
One might conjecture that, if the possibility of virtually negotiating tacit agreements helps 
achieve feasible agreements that are superior to Nash equilibria, then the possibility of continual 
renegotiation might further expand the players’ opportunities for finding mutually beneficial 
transactions. But we have seen that the reverse is the case: the possibility of renegotiation may 
fatally undermine the significance of any initial negotiation.  
 
3. VIRTUAL BARGAINING AND TACIT COMMITMENT  
In this section, we apply the concept of virtual bargaining to explain how tacit commitments can 
arise in a range of abstract games, which capture different types of common social and economic 
interactions, and which pose difficulties in the standard rational choice framework. The scenarios 
 
15 It is not necessary that the players pre-calculate the entire tree of possible moves at the outset of the 
game. Instead, the players need merely simulate, at each point in the game, what they would have agreed 
was reasonable in that situation, prior to beginning the game. For example, they might both agree to 
punish “defection” by the other prior to the game, even if such punishment were destruction to all players, 
with the aim of deterring such defection. The possibility of continual renegotiation undermines any such 
deterrence, as both parties continually start afresh and reason in a forward-looking way, and hence may 





we sketch are highly simplified, and are intended to help capture the abstract structure of an 
important type of game, rather than to model specific real-world scenarios.  
 
A. The Gas Station game 
Our first example considers a case of potentially mutually beneficial trade, but where there is 
possible conflict—the type of mutually beneficial interaction that is extremely common, and 
important, in daily life. The potential trade is sequential, and there is no third-party mechanism 
for enforcement if one party “defects” (by taking the good without providing payment). 
Intuitively, the threat of conflict appears to deter such defection. Here, the question is how the 
threat of conflict can serve as a credible deterrent, where acting on that threat is damaging to 
both players. This situation arises frequently in transactions that are costly or impossible to 
enforce.  
 Consider the transaction between a motorist and a gas station attendant on an isolated road 
(i.e., there is no law enforcement agency nearby), involving the following three stages.16 First, 
the attendant chooses whether to fill the motorist’s car with gas. After observing the attendant’s 
choice, the motorist chooses whether to pay the attendant. Finally, the attendant chooses whether 
to confront the motorist and demand money, ending in mutually damaging conflict. Naively, we 
might consider that the stronger player (whether motorist or attendant) will prevail (by taking gas 
with no payment; or taking payment without providing gas). If this were the case, however, a 
mutually beneficial transaction would not be possible. Yet we have the intuition that a “natural” 
tacit agreement is possible, whereby the two players exchange gas for money; and this tacit 
agreement will include the provision that “defection” by either player may lead to the other 
engaging in mutually damaging conflict. 
The mutually damaging nature of any such escalation, however, would seem to rule out that it 
might occur; i.e., the threat of such conflict may lack credibility and could be ignored. Indeed, 
the logic of subgame perfection, which is a powerful and appealing concept in many 
circumstances, suggests that the threat of conflict is not credible in this situation. Nonetheless, 
tacit agreements that include the threat of conflict do seem to frequently govern our behavior; 
 
16 The concrete set-up outlined below should not be taken as a realistic model of gas station transactions, 
but rather as a stylized example of a class of interactions, and one which is both widespread, and puzzling 





moreover, people do sometimes escalate to conflict when the other player “defects,” even where 
this conflict has clear negative consequences for both parties. Intuitively, we may ascribe such 
acts to emotions such as anger, the desire to “get even,” or the urge to punish a perceived sleight 
or injustice. The psychological basis of such emotions, and the potential for conflict they can 
lead to, or prevent, is of great empirical and theoretical importance (e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2002). 
One proposal concerning how to incorporate such factors has been to add other-regarding 
preferences, including preferences concerning fairness and “just” punishment, into people’s 
utility functions (e.g., Rabin, 1993). 
Here, we aim to provide a fundamentally different explanation based on tacit agreements 
reached through virtual bargaining. This explanation does not take emotional reactions as given 
— though it may help explain the origin of such reactions, in the spirit of Frank (1988) and 
Hirshleifer (1993). We suggest that understanding such tacit agreements is crucial to 
understanding how individuals can successfully engage in mutually beneficial transactions 
without external oversight or enforcement (e.g., with no cameras or police to ensure a fair 
exchange of gas and money).  
In the Gas Station game, the natural tacit agreement is that the attendant fills the car with gas 
and the motorist pays; but if the motorist did not pay, there would be (mutually damaging) 
conflict. While not a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the natural tacit agreement is a feasible 
agreement. Crucially, the motorist cannot improve her worst case by not paying: because her 
worst case is the minimum of what happens if the gas attendant either best-responds (i.e., lets the 
motorist go unpunished) or follows the agreement (i.e., initiates a mutually damaging conflict). 
Therefore, focusing on the worst case means that the threat is operative: the motorist will pay the 
attendant to avoid the worst case where mutually damaging conflict is initiated. This mechanism 
seems important for understanding tacit agreements in unobserved transactions of all kinds: 
natural tacit agreements will include the provision that reneging on the agreement will be 
punished, even where such punishment is mutually damaging. Notice that this feasible agreement 
enables the mutual benefits of trade and is hence superior for both players to the subgame perfect 
equilibrium in which no transaction occurs. 
Formally, consider an extensive-form game between two players; an attendant of a gas station 
(denoted by 𝐴) and a motorist (denoted by M). The attendant moves first and chooses whether to 





gas) and 𝐺𝑐 (refuse to provide gas). If the attendant chooses 𝐺𝑐, the game ends and both players 
get a payoff of 0. If the attendant chooses 𝐺, then it is the motorist’s turn to make a choice. The 
motorist has two alternatives; to pay for the gas or to refuse payment. Following the motorist’s 
decision, the attendant chooses whether to confront the motorist. The confrontational choice is 
denoted by 𝐹 (for “fight”) while the non-confrontational choice is denoted by 𝐹𝑐.  
The top payoffs at the terminal nodes in Figure 1 denote the payoffs to player 𝑀 while the 
bottom payoffs denote the payoffs to player 𝐴. The cost to player 𝐴 of providing gas is equal to 
4. The benefit to player 𝑀 of receiving gas is equal to 8. The cost of fighting is 10 for both 
players. The amount of payment by player 𝑀 to player 𝐴 is equal to 6. Thus, trade (provision of 
gas by player 𝐴 and paying for it by player 𝑀) is mutually advantageous.  
Table 1 contains the normal form of the game of Figure 1. In this table, the motorist is the row 
player while the attendant is the column player. The motorist has two pure strategies; “pay” and 
“not pay.” The attendant, Player 𝐴, has three information sets. The first is at the top of the game 
tree in Figure 1, where the attendant chooses whether to provide gas. The other two follow the 
motorist’s choice of payment. The triples at the top of columns in Table 1 denote player 𝐴’s pure 
strategies and specify, respectively, his choices at each of these information sets. The first 
element of a triplet denotes player 𝐴’s choice whether to provide gas, the second element 
provides his choice following payment by player 𝑀, and the third element provides his choice 
following non-payment.  
The extensive-form game in Figure 1 has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. In this 
equilibrium, the attendant does not provide gas and does not fight irrespective of the motorist’s 
choice. The motorist does not pay. Thus, according to the logic of subgame perfection, neither a 
threat to fight nor a promise to pay are credible.  
We now turn to determining the set of virtual bargaining equilibria and the set of subgame 
virtual bargaining equilibria. Consider the strategy profile where the motorist pays while the 
attendant provides gas and subsequently does not fight if the motorist pays and fights with 
probability 𝜋 if the motorist does not pay: (𝑃𝑎𝑦, (𝜋, 𝐺𝐹𝑐𝐹; 1 − 𝜋, 𝐺𝐹𝑐𝐹𝑐)). Given player A’s 
strategy, player M will prefer to pay if and if player A fights with a sufficiently large probability: 
𝜋 ≥ 0.6. Conversely, given player M’s strategy, player A nets a payoff of 2 (since player M 





profile (𝑃𝑎𝑦, (𝜋, 𝐺𝐹𝑐𝐹; 1 − 𝜋, 𝐺𝐹𝑐𝐹𝑐)), where 𝜋 ≥ 0.6, is a Nash equilibrium. Hence, it is also 
a feasible agreement. 
The two players’ payoffs for all strategy profiles in the set {(𝑃𝑎𝑦, (𝜋, 𝐺𝐹𝑐𝐹; 1 −
𝜋, 𝐺𝐹𝑐𝐹𝑐)): 𝜋 ∈ [
𝑝
𝐶𝑀
, 1]} are equal to 2. The corresponding payoff vector (2, 2) Pareto 
dominates the payoff vectors of all other feasible agreements (i.e., both players are better off 
under the agreement {(𝑃𝑎𝑦, (𝜋, 𝐺𝐹𝑐𝐹; 1 − 𝜋, 𝐺𝐹𝑐𝐹𝑐)): 𝜋 ∈ [
𝑝
𝐶𝑀
, 1]} than under other feasible 
agreements). Hence, the set of VBE of the Gas Station game is given by {(𝑃𝑎𝑦, (𝜋, 𝐺𝐹𝑐𝐹; 1 −
𝜋, 𝐺𝐹𝑐𝐹𝑐)): 𝜋 ∈ [
𝑝
𝐶𝑀
, 1]}. Thus, the transaction is sustained as long as the threat of conflict 𝜋 is 
sufficiently high.  
The SVBE coincides with the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game;17 according to 
the logic of subgame perfection as well as the logic of SVBE, any agreement in the set 
{(𝑃𝑎𝑦, (𝜋, 𝐺𝐹𝑐𝐹; 1 − 𝜋, 𝐺𝐹𝑐𝐹𝑐)): 𝜋 ∈ [
𝑝
𝐶𝑀
, 1]} entails an empty threat to fight – the threat to 
fight in the case of non-payment is not credible. Thus, under the VBE, the attendant can tacitly 
commit to fight in case of non-payment but does not have such commitment ability under the 
SVBE. This is due to the following key difference between the two concepts. Under VBE, 
players form a virtual bargain that governs the entire course of their interaction. In our example, 
the attendant and motorist virtually agree on whether (i) the attendant will provide gas, fight 
following payment, and fight following non-payment and (ii) the motorist will pay. This allows 
the attendant to tacitly commit to fight in the case of non-payment. For SVBE, players form a 
virtual bargain at each point in the game that starts a subgame. As a result, even if they virtually 
agreed on fighting in the case of non-payment, they will virtually renegotiate this commitment, 
which, in turn, will render it non-credible under SVBE.  
This analysis has an important psychological consequence: that a person’s tendency to form, 
and stick to, an entire agreement—including imposing punishments on others at a personal 
cost—can confer significant advantages, so long as this tendency is known to others. If B knows 
that A is using the VBE, then A’s implicit threats are credible, and B will avoid maltreating A (to 
 
17 In the standard terminology of game theory, this is because all the information sets of the game in 





A’s advantage). But if B suspects that A will re-think her actions at each step, in line with SVBE, 
then B will infer that A’s threats of punishment are empty, as once B has transgressed, A only 
loses further to enforcing punishment. Hence, B may maltreat A with impunity. Thus, to engage 
in successful interactions with others, it is important not merely to be a virtual bargainer who 
will fix, and not rethink, future commitments; but it is important to be known to be so. Indeed, it 
has been argued that one role of emotions, such as anger, is to increase the credibility with which 
people will stick to past commitments (e.g., implicit or even explicit threats to punish others who 
maltreat them), even when such punishments will be costly to the punisher. Thus, the outrage of 
the motorist who receives no gas, or of the gas-station attendant who receives no money, raises 
the likelihood of a mutually destructive conflict, where a cool reappraisal would lead to 
punishment being withheld. Strong emotions may overwhelm the possibility of such a cool 
reappraisal—and maintain the real threat to whichever party maltreats the other (see Frank, 1988 
for a related discussion).  
Thus, tacit agreements derived through virtual bargaining can support unobserved mutually 
beneficial transactions under VBE—and indeed such transactions are arguably the foundation of 
economic and social life: notably, early European explorers would often engage in mutually 
beneficial exchange with non-Western peoples during the very first interaction, before any 
common means of communication were established (e.g., Hough, 1994). Here the threat of 
mutually damaging conflict was, of course, very real. 
Notice, moreover, that the scope of cases of mutually beneficial transactions where behavior 
differs from the prescriptions of subgame perfection is quite broad. For example, the situation 
seems not to be significantly changed if the parties can communicate, at least where “talk is 
cheap” (i.e., no unforgeable written agreement can later be backed by a judicial system). 
Moreover, the game is unchanged, from the point of view of a standard game-theoretic analysis, 
if one or both parties can “report” the behavior of the other to third parties or to a public forum. 
This is because, in the absence of any third-party verification of what happened, whether a player 
chooses to make such a report depends on purely forward-looking considerations, and not on 
what actually happened. Accordingly, they will report “foul” if it is in their interest to do so, and 
not otherwise; and this is independent of whether the other player actually reneged on the 





receivers; and, by backward induction, would presumably not be sent in the first place. Hence, 
the possibility of making such reports does not help underpin mutually beneficial transaction. 
Virtual bargaining can, by contrast, explain how mutually beneficial transaction is possible, 
where direct retaliation may not be possible, but where one or both sides can report the other’s 
“misbehavior,” for example, by posting a negative review. Suppose that, from a forward-looking 
point of view, reporting misbehavior is somewhat costly. Then, a natural tacit agreement is that 
players will engage in mutually beneficial trade and will report bad behavior by the other only if 
it occurs. If the negative impact of such reports is sufficient (e.g., in reputational damage that 
undermines potentially beneficial future transactions with others), then this tacit agreement is a 
virtual bargain.18 
Virtual bargaining also throws light on darker aspects of human behavior. In an interaction 
between a hostage-taker and the police, the police cannot rely on the observation that harming 
the hostage is damaging to both the police’s interests (of keeping citizens from harm) and the 
hostage taker (who will not achieve his objectives and will face severe punishment). According 
to standard Nash-based reasoning, the hostage-taker’s threat is empty, and the police can safely 
advance. Yet even before communication between the two sides has been established, there may 
be a tacit agreement that neither side will act: that police advance would lead to the hostages 
being harmed; and conversely that harming the hostages would trigger police advance.  
 
B. The Centipede Game 
Our next example, the Centipede game (Aumann, 1988; Rosenthal, 1981), also concerns 
sequential interactions that are potentially mutually beneficial and are unenforced by a third 
party. In contrast to the Gas Station game, however, the players have no available threat of 
retaliation (whether credible or otherwise) that might deter “defection,” because the game ends 
immediately after such defection occurs. In the Centipede game, a mutually beneficial outcome 
appears to be threatened by the logic of backward induction. In a classic Centipede game, two 
players move alternately, with a fixed maximum number of moves. Each move either (a) ends 
the game or (b) continues the game, thereby slightly reducing the mover’s payoff, while 
considerably increasing the payoff to the other player. If both players continue for many moves, 
 
18 We have here benefitted from discussion with Bob Sugden, although the views expressed here, of 





they both end up with a substantial positive payoff—to their considerable mutual benefit. A 
“natural” tacit agreement seems possible whereby both players always choose to continue the 
game. Moreover, it is intuitively natural to expect that a player will feel annoyed or even angry if 
the other player drops out at the start (or near the start) of the game—i.e., where the tacit 
agreement has been violated. By construction, in the Centipede game, backward induction from 
the last decision node implies that the game will end on the very first move. But we have the 
strong intuition that this is not what the players would tacitly agree (or, indeed, would explicitly 
agree if they could engage in pre-play communication). Furthermore, laboratory experiments 
show that people frequently do play (nearly) to the end of the Centipede game, rather than 
defecting on the very first round following the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game 
(see, e.g., Krockow et al., 2016; Krockow et al., 2018; McKelvey & Palfrey, 1992). Many 
existing explanations of the observed behavior in the laboratory experiments rely on an argument 
that cooperation in the form of continuing the game is sustained by each player’s belief that their 
opponent has a type who prefers to continue the game.19 Our explanation is fundamentally 
different: cooperation is sustained by identifying and following a tacit agreement. 
In the Centipede game, as we have noted, no threats are possible: the question is how to 
justify continuing playing the game in the light of a backward induction argument that 
“defection” will occur on the last round, and hence the second-to-last round, and so on. The 
intuitively natural tacit agreement that both players continue to the end of the game is a feasible 
agreement—and indeed it is the best feasible agreement for both players (and hence it will be 
uniquely selected in the process of virtual bargaining). Suppose, for concreteness, that the game 
has an odd number of rounds ranging from 1 to some finite odd number. Suppose the “odd” 
player moves in the odd-numbered rounds while the “even” player moves in the even-numbered 
rounds. Consider the agreement where the parties cooperate until the end of the game. In this 
case, the “even” player’s best response is to stick to the agreement and gain the benefit of the 
odd player’s final, as well as all of the preceding, moves. Thus, the worst payoff (as defined 
above) for the odd player is the payoff she receives from the strategy profile where the two 
players cooperate till the very end. The situation for this agreement is slightly different for the 
 
19 Similarly, Kreps et al. (1982) demonstrate that cooperation in early rounds of a finitely repeated 






even player. The worst scenario for the even player is that the odd player best-responds (rather 
than follows the agreement): i.e., the odd player stops the cooperation on the very last round. 
Nonetheless, though, the even player’s payoff even in this worst case is still high; and, crucially, 
higher than the worst case from any other feasible agreement, including the Nash equilibrium, in 
which the game terminates on the first round. 
The extensive form of the game in Figure 2 depicts the version of the Centipede game which 
was put forth by Aumann (1988). There are two piles of money on the table and two players, 𝐴 
and 𝐵, who move sequentially. Initially, one of the piles contains $1 while the other pile contains 
$4. Every time it is a player’s turn to make a choice, she can either take the larger of the two 
piles (denoted by “t” in Figure 2) or pass (denoted by “p”). If a player selects t, the game ends, 
with her getting the large pile and her opponent getting the small pile. If a player passes, both 
piles are doubled and the play proceeds to the next player.  
The game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where both players choose “t” at all of 
their decision nodes. Player 𝐴’s payoff is 4 while player 𝐵’s payoff is 1 in this equilibrium. The 
set of Nash equilibria includes all strategy profiles where the two players mix between the 
choices 𝑡𝑝𝑝, 𝑡𝑝𝑡, 𝑡𝑡𝑝 and 𝑡𝑡𝑡 according to arbitrary probability distributions. Thus, the Nash 
equilibrium behavior leads to the same equilibrium outcome: the game ends on the very first 
move. We characterize the VBE and SVBE of the game in the following: 
 
Proposition 1. Consider a Centipede game with arbitrary finite number of stages 𝑛 ≥ 4. 
(a) In the unique VBE of the game, each player chooses “p” whenever it is her turn to move. 
(b) In the unique SVBE of the game, each player chooses “t” whenever it is her turn to move. 
 
Thus, under the VBE, the two players tacitly commit to always choose “p”. Deviations from 
this strategy profile are compared through the lens of worst payoffs and not payoffs. Since the 
worst payoffs of the two players under such commitment exceed the corresponding worst 
payoffs for individual deviations, the tacit commitment to always choose “p” is credible and the 
players end up doubling the pile until the very end of the game. More specifically, player 𝐵’s 
best response to player 𝐴’s strategy 𝑝𝑝𝑝 is to pass the pile twice and to take the money in the last 
period: 𝑝𝑝𝑡. Hence, player 𝐴’s worst payoff for the strategy profile (𝑝𝑝𝑝, 𝑝𝑝𝑝), where both 





bargain (𝑝𝑝𝑝, 𝑝𝑝𝑝) and her payoff of 32 for the deviation). Consider now a deviation of player 
𝐴. Suppose player 𝐴 deviates to strategy 𝑝𝑝𝑡, which entails deviating to the virtual bargain 
(𝑝𝑝𝑡, 𝑝𝑝𝑝). Player 𝐵’s best response to player 𝐴’s strategy 𝑝𝑝𝑡 is to pass the pile once and to 
take the money afterwards: 𝑝𝑡𝑡. Hence, player 𝐴’s worst payoff for the strategy profile 
(𝑝𝑝𝑡, 𝑝𝑝𝑝), where player 𝐴 passes the pile in the first two rounds while player 𝐵 always passes, 
is equal to 8 (the minimum of her payoff of 64 for the virtual bargain (𝑝𝑝𝑡, 𝑝𝑝𝑝) and her payoff 
of 8 for the deviation). Since 8 < 32, player 𝐴 will not have an incentive to deviate to the virtual 
bargain (𝑝𝑝𝑡, 𝑝𝑝𝑝). Similar calculations reveal that other deviations are not profitable either.  
As in the Gas Station game, the ability to stick to the initial agreement, rather than to 
renegotiate the bargain at each step in the game, is crucial. The SVBE of the Centipede game 
coincides with the unique subgame perfect equilibrium—the possibility of continual 
renegotiation entirely undermines the ability to make a mutually beneficial tacit agreement. 
 
C. The Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
We now turn to the finitely repeated version of what is probably the most widely studied game in 
both behavioral and theoretical game theory, the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the one-shot version of 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, players can either defect or cooperate. Irrespective of what the other 
does, each player will themselves do strictly better by defecting. Hence, the only Nash 
equilibrium of the game is (defect, defect). But the game is designed so that this pair of strategies 
is inferior to (cooperate, cooperate) for both parties—i.e., there is a mutually beneficial outcome 
that both parties could potentially achieve, if only they could make an enforceable agreement to 
do so. But forward-looking rational agents cannot do this.  
 In laboratory experiments, both cooperation and defection occur in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
in proportions that depend on complex aspects of the payoffs, the setting for the game, other 
games that have recently been played, and many other factors (Oskamp & Perlman, 1965; 
Rapoport & Chammah, 1965; Vlaev & Chater, 2006). Can virtual bargaining help explain why 
cooperation occurs in one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemmas? While the informal idea that people may 
mentally simulate a possible agreement to cooperate (and feel obligated to follow this 
agreement) may be relevant to explaining cooperation, the formal machinery of virtual 
bargaining does not give this prediction. This is because the formal notion of virtual bargaining 





for a putative cooperate-cooperate agreement is clearly that the other exploits the cooperator by 
defecting, so that the cooperator gets the worst possible outcome. Hence the VBE for Prisoner’s 
Dilemma is, like the Nash equilibrium, defect-defect.  
 
 
But the picture is very different if the Prisoner’s Dilemma is not one-off, but is repeated a finite 
number of times. This set-up shares many features with the Centipede game (i.e., sequential 
interactions that are potentially mutually beneficial and are unenforced by a third party), but 
unlike the Centipede game, defection in earlier rounds does not end the game. Although the 
players would benefit from cooperating throughout the entire game, they have an incentive to 
defect in the final stage; and according to the logic of backward induction, the players will defect 
through all prior stages. Here, we have the intuition that a “natural” tacit agreement is for the 
players to cooperate to the end or nearly the end of the finite number of repetitions of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Moreover, such an intuitive tacit agreement seems to include the provision 
that, if one player switches to “defect,” then the other may also defect thereafter. Of course, if the 
defecting player “repents” by resuming cooperation, then the other player may, but need not, re-
establish cooperation. Laboratory experiments have shown that people engage in such complex 
patterns of behavior, rather than both defecting on the very first trial and all subsequent stages, as 
the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game would predict (see, e.g., Andreoni & Miller, 1993; 
Embrey, Frechette, & Yuksel, 2018). 
The intuition for cooperating to the end or nearly the end of the finite number of repetitions is 
as follows. Backward induction implies that both players should defect in all n rounds. But a tacit 
agreement to cooperate throughout all rounds can be superior; such an agreement will include the 
“threat” to defect henceforth as soon as the other defects once. The best response to a player 
holding to such an agreement will be to cooperate until the very last turn, and then to defect. The 
worst case for the player holding to the agreement therefore sums up the benefits of 𝑛 − 1 rounds 
of mutual cooperation followed by low payoff where cooperation is met by defection in the final 
round. Which of these is chosen as the virtual bargain? The key criterion is whether the worst 
payoff for this cooperative feasible agreement is superior to the worst payoffs of alternative 
agreements that involve unilateral defections (this will of course depend on n and the precise 





the virtual bargain (although, of course, it is still possible that either player will defect in the last 
round).  
Formally, the normal form of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game is presented in Table 3. Two 
players, 1 and 2, simultaneously and independently choose between “cooperate” (denoted by 
“c”) and “defect” (denoted by “d”) strategies. In the unique Nash equilibrium of the game, both 
players “defect”.  
 Suppose now that the game of Table 3 is played finitely many times with both players 
learning the opponent’s choice in the previous round. As we argued above, in the unique 
subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, both players defect for all possible histories of the 
game. The set of VBE and the unique SVBE are characterized in the following:  
 
Proposition 2. Consider an arbitrary finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game with 𝑛 ≥ 2.  
(a) Both players will choose to cooperate along the equilibrium path20 in any VBE of the game. 
The players can “enforce” this outcome by using “grim-trigger strategies” (where a player starts 
by cooperating, cooperates as long as the opponent always cooperated in the past, and defects for 
the rest of the game after her opponent defects).  
(b) In the unique SVBE, the two players will choose to defect for each history of the game. 
 
As we elaborate in Appendix, many strategy profiles can “enforce” a VBE where both players 
always cooperate along the equilibrium path. One of these is the grim trigger strategy. The 
intuition behind this finding is as follows. Consider the agreement where the two players use the 
grim trigger strategies. The best response to the grim trigger strategy is cooperate in the first 𝑛 −
1 stages of the game and to defect in the last stage. Hence, the worst payoff from the strategy 
profile where each player follows the grim trigger strategy is equal to (𝑛 − 1) ∙ (−1) + (−10) =
−(𝑛 + 9). For illustrative purposes, suppose a player considers deviating from this strategy 
profile and decides to cooperate in the first stage and to defect in all of the remaining stages of 
the game. The deviating player’s worst payoff from that strategy profile, where she cooperates in 
the first stage and defects in all of the remaining stages while the opponent plays the grim-trigger 
strategy, is equal to (𝑛 − 1)(−7) + (−10) = −7𝑛 − 3. But this worst payoff is strictly smaller 
 
20 The equilibrium path consists of all information sets that are reached with strictly positive probability 





than the worst payoff of −(𝑛 + 9) from the pair of the grim-trigger strategies. In a similar 
fashion, one can demonstrate that neither player has a deviation that can improve her worst 
payoff. Hence, the pair of the grim-trigger strategies is feasible. Note that the subgame perfect 
equilibrium where both players defect in all stages of the game is also feasible. However, the 
virtually bargaining player will choose the agreement where they cooperate throughout the game 
over the subgame perfect equilibrium and other feasible agreements.   
 In contrast, because the VBE of the static Prisoner’s Dilemma game coincides with its 
unique Nash equilibrium, the SVBE of the repeated game coincides with the unique subgame 
perfect equilibrium. 
The logic of our derivations of the set of VBE in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game can 
also be used to shed new light on repeated interactions where players may find it to their 
advantage to alternate their moves in a coordinated manner. Recall that a turn-taking bargain 
minimizes the degree to which either person can be exploited, if the other decides to maximize 
their own interests, rather than sticking to the agreement (this recalls the farming example, 
above, of course, where alternation of effort is the preferred strategy). 
Consistent with the VBE’s prediction, Sheridan, Sharma and Cockerill (2014) argue that turn-
taking is a key landmark in a child’s development process. Indeed, Melis et al. (2016) 
demonstrate that 5-year old human children, in contrast to younger human children and 
chimpanzees, cooperate by taking turns in getting a reward in a repeated collaboration task to 
obtain that reward. Turn-taking emerges across a variety of environments involving strategic 
interactions between adults in economic experiments. Leo (2017) finds a significant amount of 
turn-taking in the repeated “Volunteer’s Dilemma” game. Sibly and Tisdell (2018) report a 
considerable amount of turn-taking in a finitely repeated modified Prisoner’s Dilemma game. 
Moreover, many subjects in their experiment engage in turn-taking until the very last round.  
 To demonstrate the plausibility of virtual bargaining as an explanation of turn-taking 
behavior, consider the normal form game in Table 4, which is a modified Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game. As in the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma game in Table 3, defection is a strictly dominant 
strategy in the modified Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The subgame perfect equilibrium of the game 
of Table 4, repeated finitely many times, is for both players to defect for all possible histories of 
the game. However, the efficient outcome of the interaction requires one of the players to 





first round the players choose (𝑐, 𝑑) whereas in the second round they choose (𝑑, 𝑐), then, 
assuming no discounting, each player nets a payoff of −10. This is higher than the payoff of 
−12 from cooperating in both rounds of the game. 
Suppose, without any loss of generality, that the game has an even number of stages and 
consider the turn-taking sequence that begins with (𝑐, 𝑑) and then alternates between (𝑐, 𝑑) and 
(𝑑, 𝑐) thereafter. It is also assumed that the game of Table 4 has more than four repetitions so 
that this alternation might occur at least twice. Suppose also that if either player deviates from 
this sequence, the opponent punishes by defecting for the rest of the game. We will call this 
strategy profile a turn-taking agreement with punishments, or simply a turn-taking agreement. 
We have: 
 
Proposition 3: Consider an arbitrary finitely repeated modified Prisoner’s Dilemma game. 
 (a) Both players will choose to play the turn-taking sequence along the equilibrium path in any 
VBE of the game. The firms can “enforce” this outcome by punishing deviations with defecting 
for the rest of the game.  
(b) In the unique SVBE, the two players will choose to defect for each history of the game. 
Proof: See Appendix 
 
Thus, the turn-taking agreement is a VBE. However, the possibility of virtual renegotiation 
nullifies the possibility of forming such agreement. It is interesting to compare the turn-taking 
agreement of Proposition 3 to an agreement that also involves alternation but at a less frequent 
rate. For example, the players could contemplate playing (𝑐, 𝑑) twice, then playing (𝑑, 𝑐) twice, 
and so on. For this type of an agreement to be feasible, the game has to be sufficiently long. 
Moreover, because the worst-case scenario that the opponent will best-respond (instead of 
sticking to the agreement for these less frequent turn-taking agreements) is less attractive than 
under the most frequent turn-taking agreement, the worst payoff for the two players under the 
former agreements will be lower than under the turn-taking agreement where the two players 
alternate in each stage. Hence, strict alternation, rather than longer cycles of alternation, will be 
selected as a virtual bargain (although, of course, the players nonetheless face the challenge of 





 As in the Gas Station and Centipede games, the ability to create a bargain concerning 
behavior throughout the game at the outset, rather than continually renegotiating as the game 
proceeds, is crucial. The collaborative behavior for mutual benefit (whether cooperating, or turn-
taking) is lost if virtual bargains are renegotiated—i.e., in these games, the SVBE is the same as 
the Nash equilibrium. 
 
D. Collusion: The Repeated Bertrand Competition game 
From the examples we have considered so far, it is natural to ask whether or not the notion of a 
SVBE is actually needed, as it has coincided with the predictions of the conventional subgame 
perfect equilibrium. But this is not always the case.  
 An example of competitive interaction illustrates the point. Consider the situation in which 
two firms set a price for the same good each day (perhaps these are neighboring gas stations). 
Both firms have an incentive to set the price as high as possible, but each will make more profit 
by slightly undercutting the other (because they will then obtain more customers, offsetting the 
loss from the slightly lower price). The standard Nash equilibrium analysis of the one-shot 
version of this game typically leads to the result that both firms choose relatively low prices, and 
to the detriment of both; and the sequential version of the game will lead to this worst possible 
outcome (for the firms) applying relentlessly across all time periods. If the players could collude 
by explicitly agreeing to set their prices high each day (typically in violation of the law), they 
would both reap considerable profits. It turns out that virtual bargaining, whether through VBE 
or SVBE allows them to collude in just this way, without having explicitly to communicate (see 
Appendix).  
Under VBE, the two firms manage to virtually agree to choose a collusive price vector that 
maximizes the sum of the two firms’ profits in every period of the game. This is the outcome that 
the firms would achieve if they had access to an external mechanism that could perfectly enforce 
any price choices by the two firms. The firms tacitly commit to “enforce” this outcome by 
punishing deviations from the collusive price by choosing sufficiently low prices for a 
sufficiently large number of periods. Although the SVBE does not enable the players to commit 
to a course of action at the outset of the game, they will still choose a price that is higher than the 
price under the subgame perfect equilibrium — specifically, they will choose the virtual 





outcome, which is worse than the VBE of the dynamic game but better than the subgame perfect 
equilibrium. The ability to partially collude under the SVBE stems from the bite of virtually 
bargaining in a single shot interaction of the Bertrand game (see Melkonyan, Zeitoun and Chater 
(2018) for more details). The firms realize that if they raise their prices, the opponent will 
undercut them. However, they will not undercut by a very large amount, and therefore increasing 
a price becomes an attractive option for a firm guided by the worst payoff. Thus, the firms 
collude under both VBE and SVBE, but the degree of collusion is higher under VBE than SVBE. 
 This example illustrates the dark side of virtual bargaining—tacit collusive behavior may be 
mutually beneficial for those engaging in the collusion, but potentially very harmful to others 
(e.g., the customers paying abnormally high prices). This point arises throughout social behavior, 
not just in market contexts—virtual bargaining provides a way of stabilizing collusive outcomes, 
involving, for example, engaging in and not reporting corruption or other misdemeanors, or 
underpinning the codes of behavior in organized crime (e.g., Gambetta, 1996). The conventional 
rational choice perspective, in contrast, often fails to explain how people can successfully work 
together in teams over finite, but lengthy, collaborative projects, or maintain long-term social 
relationships. Suppose a group of people work together on some joint activity of mutual benefit 
(whether organizing a party, clearing snow, or cooking a meal). The project will succeed in 
proportion to how much effort is made by the team members. Suppose that outright shirking is 
punished (perhaps by the team members themselves)—but that, as is true in most contexts, 
people are unable to detect people making a little less effort than the average. But then each 
player may be incentivized to work just a little less hard than the average worker—just enough to 
avoid censure. Then the curse of backwards induction looms. As the project proceeds, people 
will work, individual workers will make less effort, pulling down the average effort made; and 
this will allow individual works to adjust downwards their effort levels, pulling the average 
down further, until effort has collapsed to zero. Indeed, according to a standard rational choice 
model, the workers should all predict this outcome in advance, and hence stop working from the 
very beginning. But this “race to the bottom” need not be predicted by virtual bargaining. 
Instead, each person can reason that the best agreement would be for them all to work hard—if 
they all do, there is a mutually beneficial outcome for all. If some shirk slightly (it is not in their 
interest to shirk a lot), then there is still a mutually beneficial outcome. Hence a high level of 





 This analysis provides an interesting new perspective on the question of “cheater detection,” 
which some evolutionary psychologists have argued is crucial to the maintenance of social 
cohesion (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). It is typically assumed that cheaters must be detected and 
punished sufficiently that cheating does not ‘pay,’ to make socially beneficial collaboration 
possible. But cheating is not always detectable. We have seen that, in contexts where people’s 
incentives are such that, if they maximize their own interests they will only cheat a little, the 
virtual bargain to maintain high levels of effort on a cooperative activity may be maintained.  
 
4. COMPARISON WITH ALTERNATIVE REASONING-BASED ACCOUNTS 
Our analysis above shows how the three equilibrium concepts—the conventional subgame 
perfect equilibrium (SPE), and our new notions of virtual bargaining equilibrium (VBE), and 
subgame virtual bargaining equilibrium (SVBE)—make predictions that coincide, or diverge, 
depending on the type of strategic interaction. We argue that all three concepts are useful to 
model different phenomena. In this section, we discuss how the three concepts imply different 
degrees of tacit commitment. Then we contrast the virtual bargaining approach with alternative 
modes of non-standard reasoning. 
 Note, first, that formal modelling in psychology in the rational choice tradition typically 
focuses on finding and choosing between Nash equilibria (for one-shot games) and SPE for 
dynamic games, although this terminology is not always used. For example, a Bayesian agent 
may attempt to model the mind of another, by inferring her beliefs from her action; but she may 
in turn assume that the other is choosing her actions knowing that this will occur, and so on. 
Typically, equilibria are found by iterating the process of prediction and finding “fixed points” 
which will correspond to conventional Nash equilibria or SPE (for example, see Bayesian 
models of teaching or communication). Thus, on the one hand, according to the virtual 
bargaining account people engage in simulated bargaining to establish tacit commitments — 
which include mutually beneficial arrangements that may differ from Nash equilibria (or, for 
dynamic games, SPEs). On the other hand, the above-mentioned psychological accounts assume 
an iterative process of simulating, and best-responding to, the actions of the other agent, hence 
staying within the domain of Nash equilibria (and SPEs). Thus, the innovations embodied in this 
important class of psychological models—which help provide rational accounts of mind-reading 





2014), communication (Frank & Goodman, 2012), and joint planning (Wang et al., 2021)—are 
orthogonal to the novel contribution of the virtual bargaining approach (for discussion, see 
Chater et al., in press). 
 We stress that, in psychological models as well as older economic game-theoretic accounts, 
the SPE sheds light on many crucial phenomena, such as the conditions under which threats are 
“empty” (Selten, 1975, 1978) and questions of dynamic consistency (Kydland & Prescott, 1977). 
Reasoning by SPE implies that at any point in the history of the game, the individual ignores the 
opponent’s past actions when deciding on the present action. Whether my counterpart cooperated 
or defected in prior stages of the game does not restrict me in any way. This mode of reasoning 
has the advantage that the individual focuses only on the future consequences of her current 
decision. But in many strategic interactions, such as the ones discussed above, many people 
deviate from the SPE. 
The SVBE is similar to the SPE in that individuals ignore their counterpart’s actions in prior 
stages of the game and focus exclusively on the future consequences of the current decision. In 
contrast to the SPE, however, SVBE reasoners adopt virtual bargaining (i.e., a more 
collaborative mode of reasoning than Nash reasoning) in each stage of the game. In the games in 
Sections 3.A-3.C, SVBE leads to actions that coincide with those under SPE. But this is not 
always the case. For example, we noted that in the repeated Bertrand competition game, the 
players are able to achieve a mutually beneficial collusive outcome under SVBE not allowed by 
SPE. This finding highlights the limitations of collaborative reasoning if individuals are unable 
to tacitly commit to a course of action. 
The VBE, in contrast, implies that individuals are able to tacitly commit to a certain course of 
action (in addition to reasoning collaboratively). Crucially, VBE reasoners do not commit to any 
arbitrary course of action, but to one that represents a “natural” tacit agreement between the 
players—i.e., the agreement that they would reach if they were able to bargain explicitly. Thus, 
VBE endogenizes the option to which people may tacitly commit. A threat that is empty under 
SPE can become credible under VBE, such as the threat of fighting or reporting a defector in the 
Gas Station game, leading to a mutually beneficial outcome. Moreover, people can experience a 
psychological cost—a real sense of discomfort or outrage—if their opponent deviates from a 





foundation for explaining people’s tacit commitments, and the psychological costs they 
experience if their opponent departs from a virtual bargain. 
The concept of virtual bargaining offers a unified account that explains our strong intuitions 
behind the types of games discussed in this paper and many other strategic interactions. It is 
instructive to compare virtual bargaining with other reasoning-based accounts of strategic 
behavior that predict deviations from Nash and subgame perfect equilibria, such as quantal 
response equilibrium (QRE) (e.g., McKelvey & Palfrey, 1995) and the level-k and cognitive 
hierarchy models (e.g., Camerer, Ho, & Chong, 2004).21 How do they differ? 
First, virtual bargaining explains how players develop and follow tacit agreements based on a 
mental simulation that enables them to envision the “natural” tacit agreement. This psychological 
mechanism is different from QRE (that relies on players making errors) and level-k and 
cognitive hierarchy models (that (i) are defined iteratively starting from a “naïve” level-0 
reasoner who best-responds to some distribution of the opponents’ strategies22 and (ii) rely on 
players believing that they are more sophisticated reasoners (by 1 level) than their counterparts 
and best-responding based on these beliefs). While all these accounts have a persuasive raison 
d'être, they highlight distinct aspects of human cognition. QRE and level-k/cognitive hierarchy 
models emphasize deficiencies in reasoning, whereas virtual bargaining develops a positive 
vision of the agreements that players may want to achieve. Thus, virtual bargaining appears to be 
particularly suited to explain our intuitions behind “natural” tacit agreements, which are the 
focus of this paper.  
Second, these accounts take different approaches in extending from normal-form to extensive-
form games—this can be shown in alternative explanations of players’ behavior in the Centipede 
game. In QRE, McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) model extensive-form games using the agent 
quantal response equilibrium (AQRE), where each player treats her future self as an independent 
player with a known probability distribution over actions. In level-k reasoning, Kawagoe and 
 
21 A related non-Nash equilibrium is the maximin equilibrium (Ismail, 2014). According to this account, 
when evaluating a strategy profile, a player is guided by the minimum of her payoff from that strategy 
profile and the minimum payoff taken over the opponents’ better responses (rather than the best responses 
in the present paper). Ismail (2014) also introduces the maximin equilibrium for games with more than 
two players. The predictions of virtual bargaining and maximin equilibria coincide in some games and 
diverge in others. 





Takizawa (2012) assume that players implement behavioral strategies, which correspond to 
reducing the extensive-form into normal-form games. In this paper, we have presented two 
possible definitions of the virtual bargaining equilibrium in extensive-form games. Our standard 
definition, the VBE, aligns with Kawagoe and Takizawa’s (2012) approach and assumes that 
players can tacitly commit to a certain course of actions. Indeed, such commitment is crucial to 
our account: our alternative definition without commitment, the SVBE, assumes that such 
commitment is not possible and collapses to the subgame perfect equilibrium in games where 
players choose sequentially and all information is complete. In contrast to Kawagoe and 
Takizawa’s (2012) approach, Ho and Su (2013) introduce a level-k model for extensive-form 
games that relies on a game’s sequential structure (and does not reduce to normal forms) and 
allows for belief updating. Both Kawagoe and Takizawa (2012) and Ho and Su (2013) model 
behavioral traits different from those in the present paper. Most notably, they do not explicitly 
model tacit commitment.  
It is also instructive to compare the virtual bargaining approach with team reasoning (e.g., 
Bacharach, Gold, & Sugden, 2006). Team reasoning asks how “we” should act in order to 
benefit the team (whose objective might, for example, be a sum of the utilities of the individual 
members of the team). Virtual bargaining provides a different mechanism by which people can 
coordinate in a “team-like” way: the collective behavior is governed not by maximizing a team 
objective, but by what the parties would agree. Thus, virtual bargaining enables the actors to 
have individual objectives. Moreover, unlike team reasoning, the virtual bargaining account does 
not require any psychological identification of players as being, in any sense, “on the same side.” 
Virtual bargaining can, moreover, lead to coordinated and reasonably efficient behavior in 
certain cases where Nash or subgame perfection would predict inefficient outcomes; and it can 
do so without any assumptions about other-regarding preferences (although such preferences 
can, in the standard way, be built into the utility functions of the players, if required). According 
to virtual bargaining, players have an inherent tendency to “stick” to agreements to which they 
are tacitly committed—a tendency strong enough to have at least the potential to deter the 
violation of the agreement by others, even if punishment is mutually damaging. From the 
perspective of virtual bargaining, the tendency to punish “defection” by others arises not from 
other-regarding preferences (e.g., feelings of outrage that require “revenge”), but simply from 





tacit agreements may be an important source of positive or negative emotions towards other 
people; such emotions, in turn, may support the tendency to “go through” with the virtual 
bargain (e.g., feelings of outrage may drive punishment of the other, as specified by the virtual 
bargain, even where that punishment is mutually destructive, Fiske & Rai, 2014). Notice, too, 
that the process of virtual bargaining is a highly flexible reasoning mechanism that can lead to a 
wide variety of complex behaviors (e.g., turn-taking), depending on the nature of the interaction. 




Human interactions are frequently guided by tacit agreements; and in many situations such 
agreements can be generated flexibly and spontaneously, so that explicit communication is 
unnecessary. According to the virtual bargaining account, tacit agreements can be derived by the 
parties asking: what would we agree if we were able to communicate? Where it is clear what 
agreement would be reached, the process of communication and bargaining can be short-
circuited. 
We have outlined a formal theory of the reasoning that explains tacit commitment and can 
underpin the creation of such tacit agreements. The virtual bargaining account offers a unified 
framework to explain how people identify, commit to, and behave according to tacit agreements. 
Even without infusing imperfect information or assuming non-standard preferences, this theory 
provides a good fit with some stylized facts of empirical data: people do engage in mutually 
beneficial exchange when unobserved; collude in price-setting competition; play close to the end 
in the Centipede game; and cooperate to a considerable degree in the finitely repeated Prisoners’ 
Dilemma game. The ability to create and maintain such tacit agreements also seems crucial to the 
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Table 2. The worst payoffs for the Centipede game 
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Table 3. A Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
  Player 2 
  C D 
Player 1 
c (−1, −1) (−10,0) 








Table 4. The modified Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
  Player 2 
  C D 
Player 1 
c (−6, −6) (−10,0) 












An extensive-form game between players 𝐴 and M. Player 𝐴 moves first and chooses between 𝐺 
(provide gas) and 𝐺𝑐 (refuse to provide gas). If player 𝐴 chooses 𝐺𝑐, the game ends. If player 𝐴 
chooses 𝐺, then player M decides whether to pay for the gas or to refuse payment. Following 









There are two piles of money on the table and two players, 𝐴 and 𝐵, who move sequentially with 
player 𝐴 moving first. The game has six stages. Initially, one of the piles contains $1 while the 
other pile contains $4. Every time it is a player’s turn to choose, she can either take, “t”, the 
larger of the two piles or pass, “p”. If a player chooses “t”, the game ends, with her getting the 
large pile and her opponent getting the small pile. If a player chooses “p”, both piles are doubled 
and the play proceeds to the next player (unless the choice is made in the last sixth stage, where 







Formal Definition of VBE 
Consider a game between 𝑛 players who simultaneously and independently choose their 
strategies. Player 𝑖’s strategy is denoted by 𝜎𝑖 ∈ Σ𝑖, where 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛. Let 𝑢𝑖(𝜎𝑖 , 𝜎−𝑖)  denote 
player 𝑖’s (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛) payoff function, where the set of all opponents of player 𝑖 is denoted by 
– 𝑖, the vector of their strategies is denoted by 𝜎−𝑖 = (𝜎𝑖1 , 𝜎𝑖2 , … , 𝜎𝑖𝑛−1), and player 𝑖’s 𝑘-th 
opponent (𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑛 − 1) is denoted by 𝑖𝑘 ∈– 𝑖 . 
We begin with the first stage of a player’s reasoning to choose a strategy: finding the feasible 
agreements. The worst payoff of an agreement23 (𝜎1
𝐴, … , 𝜎𝑛
𝐴) for player 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 is defined as  
(1) 𝑤𝑖(𝜎𝑖
𝐴, 𝜎−𝑖









𝐴 , … , 𝜎𝑖𝑠𝑘
𝐴 , 𝜎𝑖𝑠𝑘+1
, … , 𝜎𝑖𝑠𝑛−1 ) : 𝑘 =
0, … , 𝑛 − 1, 𝑠𝑙 ∈ −𝑖 for all 𝑙 = 1, … , 𝑛 − 1}, 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑙
(𝜎−𝑖𝑠𝑙
𝐴 ) denotes the set of player 𝑖𝑠𝑙’s best responses to strategy 𝜎−𝑖𝑠𝑙
𝐴 . Thus, player 𝑖 
allows for the possibility that any subgroup of her opponents (𝑖𝑠𝑘+1 , … , 𝑖𝑠𝑛−1) may deviate from 
the agreement 𝜎𝐴 in a “non-cooperative” fashion with each player in the “deviating subgroup” 
independently playing a best response to strategy 𝜎𝐴. Note that player 𝑖 also believes that when 
players 𝑖𝑠𝑘+1 , … , 𝑖𝑠𝑛−1 in the deviating subgroup have multiple best responses, they will choose 
the best responses that yield player 𝑖 the highest payoff. In other words, player 𝑖 rules out the 
possibility that if some of her opponents deviate and play a best response to the agreement 𝜎𝐴 
they will do so in a spiteful fashion.24,25  
 
23 In the light of the model of reasoning envisioned in the present paper, agreement and strategy profile 
are used interchangeably. 
24 Thus, we assume that the players are “guarded pessimists.” Each player is a pessimist because she is 
guided by the worst payoff of the different contingencies in expression (1) (i.e., the min operator in (1)). 
However, her pessimism is limited because she views a set of possible deviations by a group of her 
opponents in an optimistic fashion (i.e., the sup operator in (1)). 










𝑛−1 possibilities, where (
𝑛 − 1
𝑘
) denotes the number of 𝑘-combinations of an 
(𝑛 − 1)-set. The first of these possibilities corresponds to the scenario where all of player 𝑖’s 
opponents go through with their part of the agreement 𝜎𝐴. There are also 𝑛 − 1 qualitatively 
different scenarios differentiated by the number of player 𝑖’s opponents who choose to deviate 




cases that correspond to different identities of the players in the “deviating subgroup.” 
It follows immediately from the definition in (1) that each player’s worst payoff is bounded 
from above by her payoff. The two are equal to each other if either all of the opponents do not 
have beneficial deviations or all non-spiteful deviations by the opponents do not negatively 
affect the player’s payoff.  
In a game with two players, the worst payoff of an agreement (𝜎1
𝐴, 𝜎2
𝐴) for player 𝑖 = 1,2 is 
equal to  
(2) 𝑤𝑖(𝜎𝑖
𝐴, 𝜎−𝑖







In this case, the worst payoff is equal to the least of two possibilities: (i) player 𝑖’s opponent goes 
through with her part of the agreement (𝜎1
𝐴, 𝜎2
𝐴) and (ii) best-responds to 𝜎𝑖
𝐴. The use of the min 
operator can be “rationalized” by introducing ambiguity on behalf of the players about their 
opponents’ strategies and assuming that the players have maximin expected utility preferences 
(Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1989).  
Each player is guided by the worst payoff and discards all agreements for which she can 
improve her worst payoff via a unilateral deviation. The remaining agreements are called 
“feasible.” Formally, an agreement 𝜎𝐹 is feasible if, for all 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}, 
(3)   𝑤𝑖(𝜎𝑖
𝐹 , 𝜎−𝑖
𝐹 ) ≥ 𝑤𝑖(?̃?𝑖, 𝜎−𝑖
𝐹 ) for all ?̃?𝑖 ∈ Σ𝑖. 
Let 𝑅𝑖
𝐹(𝜎−𝑖) ≡ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜎𝑖∈Σ𝑖  𝑤𝑖(𝜎𝑖 , 𝜎−𝑖) denote player i’s best-response correspondence for the 
worst payoff function. With this notation, agreement 𝜎𝐹  is feasible if and only if  
(4)     𝜎𝑖
𝐹 ∈ 𝑅𝑖





We let 𝐹 denote the set of feasible agreements. The definition in (4) reveals that an agreement 
is feasible if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of the game where the payoff of each strategy 
profile has been replaced by the worst payoff of that profile.  
In the second stage of the player’s reasoning to select a strategy, each player simulates a 
bargaining process that, given her and the opponents’ status quo positions, chooses one of the 
feasible agreements. The status quo position for each player in the bargaining process is given by 
her worst payoff from a feasible agreement that is worst for her. This assumption is consistent 
with our modeling of the players as decision-makers who view outcomes through the lens of a 





what follows, we will call 𝑤𝑖
𝑚 the minimum feasible worst payoff of player 𝑖.  
The players choose from the set of feasible agreements according to the Nash bargaining 
solution where the players’ status quo positions are their minimum feasible worst payoffs.27,28 
Formally, a virtual bargaining equilibrium (VBE) 𝜎𝑉 = (𝜎1
𝑉 , … , 𝜎𝑛
𝑉) satisfies: 




𝐹 ) − 𝑤𝑖
𝑚)𝑛𝑖=1 . 
Note that the optimization problem in (5) may have multiple solutions. There are multiple virtual 
bargaining equilibria in this case.  
 
Proof of Proposition 1. (a) For illustrative purposes, consider the case where each player has an 
opportunity to move at most three times. The result and the proof hold for arbitrary fixed number 
of stages of the game. Table 2 contains the two players’ worst payoffs for different combinations 
of pure strategies. It follows immediately from this that the set of feasible agreements consists of 
the strategy profile (𝑝𝑝𝑝, 𝑝𝑝𝑝) as well as the set of Nash equilibria comprised of all possible 
probability distributions over the strategies 𝑡𝑝𝑝, 𝑡𝑝𝑡, 𝑡𝑡𝑝 and 𝑡𝑡𝑡 for each of the two players. 
Note that both players’ payoffs are larger for the strategy profile (𝑝𝑝𝑝, 𝑝𝑝𝑝) than for any Nash 
equilibrium of the game. Hence, from (5), (𝑝𝑝𝑝, 𝑝𝑝𝑝) is the unique VBE of the game. 
 
26 For space considerations, we do not consider alternative assumptions for the fallback position. We note, 
however, that the predictions of our model of reasoning are robust for many sensible alternatives.  
27 Krishna and Serrano (1996) characterize a bargaining procedure akin to Rubinstein’s alternating offer 
game for the general case of 𝑛 players and demonstrate that when the players are sufficiently patient the 
equilibrium agreement in their setup approximates the 𝑛-player Nash bargaining solution. 





(b) Since all of the information sets of the game are singletons, the SVBE coincides with the 
unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. QED   
 
Proof of Proposition 2. (a) We will say that a player plays the (𝑛 − 𝑘)-stage (for 𝑘 = 0, . . , 𝑛 −
1) grim trigger strategy if (i) in the first (𝑛 − 𝑘) stages, the player starts by cooperating, 
cooperates as long as the opponent always cooperated in the past, and defects for the rest of the 
game after her opponent defects and (ii) the player always defects in the last 𝑘 stages of the 
game, irrespective of own and the other player’s choices. When 𝑘 = 0, we will simply say that a 
player uses the grim trigger strategy.  
Consider the case where a player, say Player 1, plays the grim trigger strategy. A best response29 
for Player 2 to Player 1’s strategy is to cooperate in the first (𝑛 − 1) stages of the game and to 
defect in the last stage. Hence, the worst payoff to Player 1 from the strategy profile where each 
player follows the grim trigger strategy is equal to (𝑛 − 1) ∙ (−1) + (−10) = −(𝑛 + 9). To 
verify that the strategy profile where each player uses the grim trigger strategy is a feasible 
agreement, consider a deviation by Player 1. A deviation by Player 1 will have her defecting 
instead of cooperating in at least one of the stages of the game. Let 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑛 denote the first 
stage that Player 1 defects. Given that the agreement stipulates that Player 2 choose the grim 
trigger strategy, Player 1’s payoff from such deviation will be equal to (𝑘 − 1) ∙ (−1) +
(𝑛 − 𝑘)(−7). When 𝑘 > 2, Player 2’s best response is to defect in all stages from (𝑘 − 1) 
through 𝑛 and to cooperate in stages 1 through (𝑘 − 2). When 𝑘 ≤ 2, Player 2’s best response is 
to defect in all stages of the game. Player 1’s payoff when Player 2 plays this best response is 
equal to  
(9)    {
(𝑘 − 2) ∙ (−1) + (−10) + (𝑛 − 𝑘 + 1)(−7), 𝑖𝑓 𝑘 > 2
(𝑛 − 1)(−7) + (−10),                                          𝑖𝑓 𝑘 = 2
𝑛 ∙ (−7),                                                                   𝑖𝑓 𝑘 = 1
. 
Each of the expressions is less than Player 1’s worst payoff of −(𝑛 + 9) under the agreement 
where both players choose the grim trigger strategy. Thus, deviation in any stage of the game 
 
29 Due to a certain degree of freedom to specify actions off the “equilibrium path,” there might be several 
best responses to a player’s strategy. The behavior on the “equilibrium path” is, however, identical for all 





yields a strictly lower worst payoff, which implies that the pair of the grim trigger strategies is a 
feasible agreement.  
Consider now the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game where both players defect in 
all stages of the game irrespective of the history of the game. By the definition of feasible 
agreement, this strategy profile is also feasible. The worst payoff of both players for this strategy 
profile is equal to −7𝑛.  
Note that these two strategy profiles, the pair of the grim trigger strategies and the unique 
subgame perfect equilibrium, do not exhaust the set of feasible agreements. Consider, for 
example, the following variant of the grim trigger strategy. Suppose that, similarly to the grim 
trigger strategy, a player starts by cooperating and cooperates in all 𝑛 stages of the game. In 
contrast to the grim trigger strategy, the new strategy doesn’t prescribe defection for the rest of 
the game following a defection by the opponent. Rather, in the case of an early first deviation30 
by the opponent the player defects only for a number of periods that is sufficient to deter the 
deviation. For example, following the first deviation by the opponent, the player may cooperate 
once and defect in the remaining stages of the game. The worst payoff to either player when the 
players virtually agree that each will play this new strategy is equal to −(𝑛 + 9), which is the 
same worst payoff for the agreement consisting of the grim trigger strategies.  
In addition, there are a number of equilibria that qualitatively differ from the above strategy 
profiles both on and off the equilibrium path. For example, an agreement where both players 
play the (𝑛 − 𝑘)-stage grim trigger strategy is feasible. It follows immediately from our 
derivations above that the worst payoffs to the two players in all feasible agreements, including 
the subgame perfect equilibrium, cannot strictly exceed the worst payoff for the agreement where 
both players follow the grim trigger strategy. Hence, by the definition of the VBE in (5) and 
because the players have equal bargaining powers, the latter strategy profile is a VBE. Moreover, 
any VBE of the game will entail cooperation by both players in all 𝑛 stages of the game.31 
(b) To determine the SVBE, first consider the last stage of the game. In the SVBE for any history 
of the game in this stage, each player will defect. Solving the game backwards, similarly to the 
 
30 By early deviations, we mean deviations from the path prescribed by the pair of the grim trigger 
strategies which occurs in a relatively early stage of the game. 
31 There are also asymmetric virtual bargaining equilibria where the players use different strategy profiles 





repeated Bertrand competition game, we find that the SVBE coincides with the unique subgame 
perfect equilibrium of the game where both players defect for all possible histories of the game. 
QED   
 
Proof of Proposition 3. (a) Suppose that each player follows her part of the turn-taking 
agreement with punishments. Any best response for Player 2 to Player 1’s strategy will entail 
sticking to the turn-taking sequence in the first (𝑛 − 1) stages of the game and defecting in the 




− 1) ∙ (−10) + (−10) + (−7) = −(5𝑛 + 7).  
Consider now the worst payoff to Player 2 from the turn-taking agreement with punishments. 
Given Player 2’s strategy, Player 1 will not have any incentive to deviate from the agreement. 
Player 1 has no incentive to change her choice in the last stage. She also has no incentive to 
change her choice in the penultimate stage because she would get a continuation payoff of -14 
from a deviation to “d” in the stage as opposed to a continuation payoff of -10 from sticking to 
turn-taking. Advancing this logic toward the top of the game tree, we find that Player 1 does not 
have any incentives to deviate in any of the stages of the game. Hence, Player 2’s worst payoff 
from the turn-taking agreement is equal to −5𝑛.  
To verify that the pair of the turn taking strategies with punishments is a feasible agreement, 
consider a deviation by Player 1. Let 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑛 denote the first stage when Player 1 defects. A 
deviation by Player 1 will have her defecting instead of cooperating if 𝑘 is odd and cooperating 
instead of defecting if 𝑘 is even. Given that the agreement stipulates that Player 2 defects for the 
remainder of the game after any deviation by player 1, Player 1’s payoff from such deviation will 
be equal to (
𝑘−1
2




− 1) ∙ (−10) − 10 − 6 + (𝑛 − 𝑘) ∙ (−7) = −7𝑛 + 2𝑘 − 6 if 𝑘 is even. Hence, if Player 1 
deviates in any stage preceding the penultimate stage (𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑛 − 2) or in the last stage 
(𝑘 = 𝑛), her payoff, and hence her worst payoff, will be smaller under the deviation than her 
worst payoff under the agreement where both players choose the turn taking with punishments 
strategy.  
Finally, consider a deviation where Player 1 cooperates in stages 1 through (𝑛 − 2) but defects 





in stage (𝑛 − 3). Hence, Player 1’s worst payoff for the agreement where she cooperates in 
stages 1 through (𝑛 − 2) but defects in stages (𝑛 − 1) and 𝑛 while Player 2 plays the turn taking 
with punishments strategy is equal to (𝑛 − 4) ∙ (−5) + (−10) + (−7) + 2 ∙ (−7) = −5𝑛 − 11. 
This worst payoff is also lower than the worst payoff −(5𝑛 + 7) from the pair of the turn taking 
strategies with punishments. Thus, deviation in any stage of the game yields a strictly lower 
worst payoff for Player 1. A similar argument can be used to establish that, starting from the 
agreement comprised of the pair of the turn taking strategies with punishments, Player 2 cannot 
improve her worst payoff by deviating to an alternative agreement. Thus, the turn taking 
agreement is feasible. 
Using derivations similar to those for the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, one can 
demonstrate that the worst payoffs for the two players in all feasible agreements cannot strictly 
exceed the worst payoffs for the turn taking agreement. Take, for example, the agreement 
consisting of the grim trigger strategies for both players. The worst payoff of both players under 
this agreement is equal to (𝑛 − 1) ∙ (−6) + (−10) = −(6𝑛 + 4), which is lower than the worst 
payoff −(5𝑛 + 7) for the turn-taking agreement as long as the game has more than three stages. 
Hence, by the definition of the VBE in (5), the turn-taking agreement is a VBE because the 
players have equal bargaining powers. Moreover, any VBE of the game will involve alternation 
by both players in all 𝑛 stages of the game. 
(b) Similar to the corresponding part of Proposition 2. QED.  
 
 
Collusion and SVBE. Consider a Bertrand game repeated 𝑛 ≥ 3 times as, for example, 
described in Melkonyan, Zeitoun and Chater (2018). There, we examine a one-shot Bertrand 
game and characterize its virtual bargaining equilibrium. To focus on the dynamic 
considerations, we adopt the same linear demand function setup as in their paper. In each stage 
of the game, two firms, 𝑖 = 1, 2, simultaneously and independently choose their prices 𝑝𝑖 ∈ ℝ+. 
The marginal costs of the firms are equal to zero while their direct demand functions are 𝑞1 =
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝1 + 𝑐𝑝2  and   𝑞2 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝2 + 𝑐𝑝1, where 𝑏 ≥ 𝑐 > 0.
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First, consider the one-shot interaction. Firm 𝑖’s profit function is given by 𝜋𝑖(𝑝𝑖, 𝑝−𝑖) =









. The price combination that 






. From Melkonyan, Zeitoun and Chater (2018), the unique virtual bargaining 





. It follows from these expressions that the 
price under virtual bargaining, as well as the joint profits, fall strictly between their respective 
values under Nash and the collusive outcome (see Proposition 2 in Melkonyan, Zeitoun and 
Chater, 2018).  
Consider now the finitely repeated version of the game. In the unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium of the game, the two firms will pick the Nash equilibrium price 𝑝𝑁 for all possible 
histories of the game. We are left with characterizing the set of VBEs and SVBEs of the dynamic 
game.33 It can be shown that the two firms will choose the collusive price vector 𝑝∗ along the 
equilibrium path34 in any VBE of the repeated Bertrand competition game. The firms can 
“enforce” this outcome by punishing deviations from 𝑝∗ via sufficiently low prices for a 
sufficiently large number of periods. In the unique SVBE, the two firms choose the VBE of the 
static game 𝑝𝑉 for each history of the game. Thus, the SVBE diverges from the conventional 
SPE—even when players re-think their behavior at each step, there are circumstances in which 
they can arrive at mutually beneficial outcomes not attainable through the standard SPE.  
Thus, the firms “enforce” the collusive price vector by punishing the opponent. An example is 
the grim trigger strategy where the firm starts by choosing the collusive price 𝑝∗ and continues 
with that price as long as both players always chose 𝑝∗ in the past, and chooses Bertrand price 
𝑝𝑁 for the rest of the game after a deviation from 𝑝∗. 
It also follows that the prices and joint profits under SVBE fall strictly between the prices and 
joint profits under subgame perfect and virtual bargaining equilibria. The repeated nature of the 
 
33 To minimize our notation, we abstract away from discounting here and in the other games.  
34 By an equilibrium path, we mean the collection of all information sets that are reached with strictly 
positive probability given the players’ strategies. A deviation from the equilibrium path involves a 
different choice at an information set that is reached with a strictly positive probability. A deviation off 





game and the commitment capacity characterizing VBE of extensive form games open up 
possibilities for the two firms to achieve outcomes that are preferred by both firms to the 
corresponding SVBE. Moreover, in the repeated Bertrand game, the ability to commit, entailed 
in VBE, enables the two firms to achieve the outcome that is first-best from their perspective. 
 
 
 
